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The paper discusses the role of argumentative competencies for the achievement
of patient engagement through communication in doctor-patient consultations. The
achievement of patient engagement is being proposed by recent studies as a condition
that can facilitate in particular patient adherence, which involves behavior change. One
obstacle to behavior change that has been observed is reactance, i.e., resistance to
persuasive messages when a threat to freedom is perceived. In the medical field,
reactance theory has been mostly applied in the field of mental health, less frequently
to understand non-adherence in general. However, a few studies have revealed that
reactance can actually explain in part the motives behind non-adherence. These studies
propose that the arousal of reactance could be limited or prevented by adopting relational
measures aimed at giving patients the feeling that they still hold some control over the
process of care and that the “impositions” on their freedoms are acceptable because they
have had the opportunity to decide about them. However, they do not discuss how these
strategies should be operationalized at the dialogical level. A debated issue in the study
of reactance is the role played by knowledge. It seems that pure information regarding
an issue is likely to represent a threat in itself. Complementary to this is the finding that
quality of argument does not impact on the degree of reactance. These findings pose a
problem in view of the goal of patient education, itself considered as a necessary premise
for any process of patient engagement and adherence. It seems necessary to move away
from a conception of education as mere transmission of information and look for more
effective ways of transferring knowledge to patients. With regard to this issue, the paper
argues that useful insights can be found in studies on science education, in which it is
shown experimentally that argumentative processes favor learning and understanding.
Drawing on previous studies and taking an interdisciplinary perspective on the issue,
the paper brings into the discussion on engagement concepts developed in the field
of argumentation theory, showing how the suggestions for avoiding reactance could be
realized dialogically.
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INTRODUCTION
The paper discusses the role of argumentative competencies for
the achievement of patient engagement through communication
in doctor-patient consultations.
Patient engagement “qualifies the relation that the patient [...]
may establish with his/her reference healthcare system [...] in the
different phases of the care process” (Graffigna et al., 2015, p.
8). It is a concept borrowed from the marketing and consumer
behavior literature to describe consumers’ positive attitudes
toward brands or products (Gambetti and Graffigna, 2010). In
the healthcare context, it is meant to signify a proactive attitude of
patients, understood as “consumers” of healthcare. Such engaged
attitude, when successfully achieved, would imply that patients
are proactive on two levels: (1) they are able to correctly solicit the
healthcare system when in need for assistance; (2) they are able
to correctly manage their health condition without improperly
referring to the healthcare system (patient autonomy).
In this sense, the concept of engagement takes a step forward
in comparison to the notions of compliance, adherence, self-
management, patient empowerment and patient activation, as it
refers to the relationship between patients and healthcare systems
in their complexity. Moreover, it implies a more active view of
patients, who are not simply “activated” by their providers, but
independently take an active role in themanagement of the whole
process of care that concerns them (Graffigna et al., 2015, pp.
16–20).
Full patient engagement is the result of a gradual process
that allows patients to rise from a condition of blackout, to one
of eudaimonic project, in which the disease is not the center
of attention anymore, but is fully integrated in the patient’s
life (Graffigna et al., 2014). In other words, in the eudaimonic
project condition (the “perfection” of engagement) patients do
not perceive themselves just as “patients,” but as individuals who
also have a health condition that requires some attention. But
the actions that need to be taken in order to manage this health
condition are not felt as impairing as they might have been
at the beginning (Graffigna et al., 2014, 2015). In the Patient
Health Engagement Model (PHE), Graffigna and colleagues have
detailed the phases patients go through in their progress toward
the condition of eudaimonic project. TheModel is represented in
Figure 1.
The PHE Model details and relates the cognitive, emotional
and behavioral conditions that characterize the pathway from
the initial condition of blackout, usually following the first
diagnosis, to the condition of being fully engaged and able
to integrate the health condition within a life project. As full
engagement is the final outcome of this progress, it appears that,
especially at the beginning but also along the way, individuals
need to be educated to understand their new status as patients,
and motivated to take up any new behavior that their health
condition requires (Graffigna et al., 2015, pp. 36–38). Thus,
it appears that the condition of “being engaged” originates in
the one-to-one relationship with healthcare providers (medical
doctors, nurses, counselors, etc.) and is triggered by their ability
to motivate patients and support their efforts toward behavior
change.
Particularly in this respect, “being engaged” should include
among other behaviors the ability for patients to more easily
adhere to providers’ therapeutic prescriptions and suggestions for
healthier lifestyles (Graffigna et al., 2014). As such, engagement
is understood as a pre-requisite for adherence (Graffigna et al.,
2015, p. 17).
In the following discussion, attention is devoted in particular
to the communicative processes that may play a role in the
activation of patient engagement. The assumptions on which the
discussion is based are that: (1) patient engagement originates
in the relationship with one or more healthcare providers in
their capacities as representatives of the healthcare system;
(2) the tools that support and maintain this relationship are
communicative in nature. More specifically, the paper discusses
the case of psychological reactance, which can hinder motivation
to behavior change and engagement. As such, reactance can be
considered as one of the many judgment biases that have been
identified by researchers in the behavioral sciences during the
past 40 years or so (Fischhoff, 1975; Kahneman et al., 1982; Petty
and Cacioppo, 1986). For many of these biases, corresponding
debiasing techniques have been studied and tested (Fischhoff,
1982; Arkes, 1991; Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Croskerry et al.,
2013). Also drawing on previous studies (Bigi, 2014a, 2015; Bigi
and Lamiani, 2016), it is argued that reactance can be prevented
or limited by an appropriate use of argumentative strategies,
used within the structure of the deliberation dialogue. In this
sense, argumentation strategies could be considered and should
be further experimentally tested as a form of debiasing.
PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE IN
RELATION TO THE PROBLEM OF
NON-ADHERENCE
Psychological reactance is described as resistance to persuasive
messages when a threat to freedom is perceived (Brehm, 1966;
Brehm and Brehm, 1981). This condition brings individuals to do
the contrary of what they are asked to do or to persist in a wrong
behavior even in the face of evidence. The key factors involved in
the arousal of reactance are freedom, threat to freedom, reactance
and restoration of freedom. Studies have shown that reactance is
the result of a combination of cognitive and affective processes,
in which negative cognition and anger play a major role (Dillard
and Shen, 2005; Rains and Turner, 2007).
The analysis of reactance as a potential threat to the
achievement of patient engagement is relevant for two orders
of reasons: (1) the institutional and asymmetrical nature of
interactions between patients and providers, which could imply
in itself a threat to freedom; (2) the fact that little attention has
been paid so far to the role reactance could play in relation to
non-adherence.
In the medical field, reactance theory has been mostly applied
in the field of mental health, less frequently to understand non-
adherence in general (Fogarty, 1997). However, a few studies
have revealed that reactance can actually explain in part the
motives behind non-adherence (Fogarty, 1997; Dillard and Shen,
2005; Orbell and Hagger, 2006; Rains and Turner, 2007). These
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FIGURE 1 | The Patient Health Engagement Model.
studies propose that the arousal of reactance could be limited
or prevented by adopting certain measures, e.g., spending time
with patients familiarizing them with the procedures they will
undergo, answering their questions and listening to their non-
medical comments; simplifying the behavior changes requested
of patients; reducing the magnitude of the requested tasks; when
possible, offering the opportunity to choose among different
and equally acceptable solutions to the problem (Fogarty, 1997).
These and other strategies are aimed at giving patients the feeling
that they still hold some control over the process of care and
that the “impositions” on their freedoms are acceptable because
they have had the opportunity to decide about them. However,
these studies do not discuss how these strategies should be
operationalized at the communicative level, andmore specifically
at the level of dialogue. In particular, it is not clear what role is
played by knowledge and persuasion.
As far as knowledge is concerned, it seems that pure
information regarding an issue, e.g., a disease, is likely to
represent a threat in itself, as it sheds light on possible limitations
to freedom for the individual, who in turn will experience
reactance (Brehm and Brehm, 1981; Fogarty, 1997). In particular,
experimental findings (Dillard and Shen, 2005) suggest that those
who design health messages should pay attention to health topics
that may interfere with strength of threat: the study reported
an experiment with messages related to flossing vs. responsible
drinking, targeting college students. The latter were found to
arouse more reactance because they were perceived as more
threatening of freedom. The problem is that responsible drinking
runs counter to social norms of conduct in certain groups,
therefore complying with messages suggesting different styles
of drinking puts individuals at risk of being stigmatized within
their social group (Dillard and Shen, 2005, pp. 163–164). These
findings suggest that the role and provision of information to
patients deserves careful consideration especially at the dialogical
level.
With regard to persuasion, another study found that quality
of argument does not impact on the degree of reactance (Rains
and Turner, 2007), because it seems that perceiving a threat to
freedom is enough to cause anger and negative cognitions that
actually make the quality of arguments irrelevant. In other words,
once certain information has been provided and reactance has
been aroused, the potential benefits of persuasion are reduced
by the emotional component of reactance itself, i.e., anger and
negative cognition. It also seems that reactance is strengthened by
the perception of dominance, i.e., the extent to which a message
reveals that the sender believes s/he can control the receiver.
On the other hand, when justifications for requesting a certain
behavior are provided, this softens the feeling of threat and
reduces the arousal of reactance. It is possible to distinguish in
these findings two different ways in which argumentation is used:
with the aim of persuading (in the sense of obtaining consensus
or compliance) and with the aim of providing reasons to support
a claim (with the aim of finding agreement over a debated issue).
In all the studies reported, there seems to be a close connection
between the arousal of reactance and the processes of providing
information about and reasons for action. In particular, it seems
that the quantity, quality and context of the messages that are
conveyed to patients can dramatically change the way threats
to freedom are perceived. It appears therefore justified to try
and understand the informative and argumentative processes
from a dialogical perspective, which may allow to clarify their
structures and roles in relation to reactance on the one hand,
and engagement on the other. To this end, in the following
sections insights from the field of argumentation theory are
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called into the picture and discussed in relation to the notion of
reactance.
PREVENTING REACTANCE AROUSAL
THROUGH EFFECTIVE PRAGMATIC
ARGUMENTATION
In her discussion on reactance and patient non-adherence,
Fogarty (1997, pp. 1282–1283) puts forward a series of practical
suggestions that should limit patients’ reactance to providers’
indications.
The final goal of providers’ efforts at patients’ involvement
is, in Fogarty’s terms, fueling patients’ perception that they are
retaining some degree of control over the procedures they need
to undergo, and that they are freely conceding something to
the provider, instead of being persuaded against their will into
something they did not want to do. This should decrease the
perception of loss of freedom, thereby also reducing reactance.
The process of eliciting patients’ cooperation should also increase
the likelihood of future adherence, as studies show that those
who comply with small requests are more likely to comply again,
even with larger requests, in the future (Freedman and Fraser,
1966; Snyder and Cunningham, 1975; Souchet and Girandola,
2013). By explicitly requesting patients’ cooperation at the
beginning of the encounter, Fogarty suggests that an atmosphere
of “mutual interdependence” (1997, p. 1283) is created, which
can be preserved by letting patients become active participants
in the discussion regarding therapeutic regimens, so that the final
decision will result in a “negotiated regimen” formulated through
the integration of patients’ perspectives. In this respect, Fogarty
provides a list of practical suggestions for providers:
1. discuss with patients how to fit the prescribed regimen into
their and their families’ lifestyles;
2. keep treatments as simple as possible (on this concept, see also
more recent experiments by Fogg, http://tinyhabits.com);
3. show willingness to keep therapies as short as possible and to
eliminate unnecessary proposals;
4. offer more than one effective alternative, whenever possible,
and let patients select the one that best fits their preferences
and possibilities. This suggestion in particular is aimed at
communicating the perception of the provider as someone
who is willing to make concessions. A universal rule of
behavior (Cialdini, 2007; Ariely, 2008) dictates that when
one party is willing to make concessions, the other one will
reciprocate.
The kind of “discussion” described by Fogarty, basically
corresponds to what argumentation scholars call “pragmatic
argumentation,” which happens when the parties need to agree
on the solution to a problem, and discuss the validity of a
course of action based primarily on its consequences (Perelman,
1959). In this use of argumentation, the positive or negative
evaluation of the consequences is transferred to the causes, which
are accordingly accepted or rejected.
In more concrete terms, during the medical encounter one
therapeutic regimen may be preferred over another because it
is believed to obtain more positive consequences. Clearly, in
order to align each other’s criteria for the evaluation of the
consequences it is necessary for both parties to be able to express
their preferences during the discussion. Moreover, in order to put
into practice suggestions 1. and 2. patients should be able to put
forward their own proposals or perspectives on the provider’s
suggestions. In order for this communicative process to be
effective, it cannot be left entirely to the good will or talent of
providers. Its inner workings, potential and risks should be laid
out and explained. In the next section, this is done by resorting
to the model of the deliberation dialogue (Walton, 1989; Walton
and Krabbe, 1995).
ADVANTAGES OF USING A MODEL OF
DELIBERATION
The model of the deliberation dialogue has been developed
within an approach that aims at representing and analyzing
types of dialogue as communicative intentions within a verbal
interaction (Walton and Krabbe, 1995; Walton and Macagno,
2007). As such, the representations of the types of dialogue
are abstract, normative frameworks capturing shared dialogical
intentions. The deliberation dialogue is one among seven types of
dialogues, described according to the intentions of and the initial
relationship between the interlocutors: information-seeking,
persuasion, deliberation, inquiry, negotiation, and eristics.
The structure of the deliberation dialogue outlines the most
effective dialogical moves aimed at finding an acceptable course
of action to achieve a certain goal (Walton, 2010; Walton et al.,
2010). This kind of dialogue usually takes place when there is no
compelling objective way of coping with a problem and parties
discuss their reasons for proposing a certain solution; in this
sense, it is a representation of pragmatic argumentation. It is
therefore appropriate for the representation of the deliberative
process occurring within a medical encounter when providers
and patients need to discuss the acceptability of a therapeutic
regimen or of a specific behavior.
One important premise for deliberation dialogues is that
parties are out to reach a collective goal, which can be contrary
to or different from the individuals’ personal goals (Walton et al.,
2010). This is true also of the kind of deliberations occurring
within medical encounters. Indeed, the arousal of reactance can
be partly explained as resistance to a potential threat that is
perceived due to a misalignment between the parties’ intentions
and preferences. Part of the deliberative effort is precisely to
set a shared goal in a collaborative way (Bigi, 2014a), which
is basically what Fogarty (1997) suggests when proposing that
patients’ collaboration be explicitly invited.
The structure of deliberation dialogues is represented in
Figure 2 (Walton et al., 2014).
As shown in Figure 2, deliberation dialogues usually develop
in three stages: the opening stage, the argumentation stage and
the closing stage. The stages of the dialogue do not correspond
to phases in the structure of the medical encounter; their names
refer to the development of the deliberative process and they are
not meant to represent the chronological order in which stages
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FIGURE 2 | The structure of the deliberation dialogue.
appear in real-life interactions, even if they do represent the
most logical order in which they should appear. In other words,
they represent the ideal organization of an optimal deliberation
dialogue.
Deliberation in this model is represented as a complex
dialogue type, resulting from the combination and intersection
between the persuasion and the information seeking dialogues.
In the opening stage, the parties share relevant information
regarding the problem at issue. In this stage information is
functional to the argumentative process that will follow, therefore
it is crucial that parties share what they know about the problem,
but also their preferences, values, circumstances that may in any
way bear an import on the kind of solution that can be found. The
aims of this stage remind of some of the suggestions for practice
put forward by Fogarty (1997), in particular the indication to
spend time with patients before the actual encounter, listening to
their concerns of personal, non-medical nature (Fogarty, 1997,
p. 1283). For Fogarty this procedure is aimed at keeping patients
involved in the process of care, thereby limiting their perceptions
of threat to their freedom.However, from a dialogical perspective,
this is also a precious indication for the achievement of more
effective deliberations. Indeed, proposals for therapeutic regimes
or behaviors will be much more tailored to patients’ actual
conditions and abilities if providers are aware of them (in line
with the suggestion to keep treatments as simple as possible, from
the patient’s point of view; to take into consideration patients’
abilities to do certain things; and to find the best way to fit the
prescribed regimens into patients’ lifestyles).
The opening stage then gives way to the argumentation stage,
which is the heart of deliberation. Here the parties start putting
forward proposals for the solution of the problem, based on
the previously shared information and on the shared goals of
the interaction. The relevance of this stage in relation to the
issue of reactance is very high. First, it is assumed that both
parties should put forward at least one proposal to solve the
problem. This is coherent with the indication to engage patients
in the discussion in order to reach a negotiated regimen that is
acceptable to both parties. Second, it is also foreseen by the model
that if new information emerges during the argumentation stage
this might imply that the parties revise their initial proposals.
This is coherent with the suggestion to providers to be willing to
make concessions and to offer more than one option for patients’
choice.
Upon finding an option that is acceptable for both parties, the
dialogue enters its closing stage. Here it is important that patients
make explicit commitments to carrying out the chosen behavior
or therapy. Providers’ commitment to providing expert advice
and the best options available are presupposed by the institutional
context within which the interaction takes place.
This structure helps to clarify the role information and
argumentation play within the deliberative process and their very
close connection and interdependence. Moreover, at least at a
theoretical level, it would seem that carrying out deliberations
by following the structure and premises of the deliberation
dialogue should prevent or limit the arousal of reactance. Indeed,
the model foresees that both parties are fully engaged in the
deliberative process at all stages, which basically realizes Fogarty’s
suggestion to keep patients involved in the process of care so as
to limit reactance by softening the strength of threat.
Thus, theoretically speaking, this model of deliberation
could be proposed to clinicians as a “deliberation protocol”
that would allow to overcome sloppy or naïve—and thus,
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ineffective—realizations of deliberation. However, before
discussing practical applications of the model, the role of
information in relation to reactance should be discussed.
THE ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE IN RELATION
TO REACTANCE
As already mentioned, patient education is discussed by Fogarty
(1997, pp. 1284–1285) as a way to limit patient reactance
and non-adherence. Moreover, the findings by Dillard and
Shen (2005) show that information should be framed very
carefully also depending on the potential strength of threat
implied by certain health topics. Thus, the use of knowledge
as a means to achieve adherence should be managed carefully.
Indeed, more information can have the boomerang effect of
increasing reactance, because by knowing more about their
disease individuals are also more aware of possible further
limitations on their freedom, thus behave in ways that try to
prevent these limitations. Another problem with knowledge is
that it may interfere with patients’ Locus of Control: patients
who wish to remain in control of their lives may feel excessively
threatened by education programs that enhance their awareness
of the many ways in which the disease and its treatments will
“take control away” from them (Fogarty, 1997).
In order to better understand the role of information in the
provider-patient encounter and in relation to the arousal of
reactance, a general distinction that can be made is between
information as the means to achieve patient education on the
one hand, and as a component of the process of pragmatic
argumentation on the other. This distinction can be useful
because it allows to collocate the provision of information
within two rather distinct dialogical processes, thus more easily
identifying its role, potential and risks in relation to the arousal
of reactance.
As a means to achieve patient education, the provision of
information should be considered first of all from an institutional
point of view. Indeed, the medical encounter is by definition
an institutional context of interaction, with predefined roles,
aims and norms that regulate the communicative exchange.
Depending on the design of each healthcare system, these
institutional elements may vary, but generally speaking providing
information to patients regarding their health condition is
considered to be one of the aims of the encounter. Therefore,
providers cannot avoid this step and if knowledge can produce
reactance, it is important to understand how it can be provided
in a way that may limit or prevent its arousal.
Based on the considerations presented above referring to the
boomerang effect of knowledge, it seems necessary to move
away from a conception of education as mere transmission of
information. In this respect, helpful insights may be gained from
studies in the field of science education, in which it is shown
experimentally that argumentative processes favor learning and
understanding (Schwartz and Asterhan, 2010; Felton et al., 2015).
More specifically, when students are given the task of “finding
agreement” on an issue, they seem to be more willing to open up
to different points of view and understandings of the problem.
Moreover, argumentative practices seem fundamental for the
achievement of conceptual change, i.e., a radical reframing of
knowledge, which is often necessary in the case of lay beliefs
and misrepresentations of health issues that patients often bring
to the encounter and that impact on patients’ expectations and
on the ways they make decisions or form commitments. The
“exercise” of using argumentative strategies for patient education
in analogy to experiments with students could be done during
group-work with patients, where peer-to-peer interaction may
also favor the expression of personal beliefs. On the other hand,
the “exercise” of reaching radical conceptual change regarding
wrong beliefs or lay prejudices about diseases should probably be
conducted during the one-to-one encounter with the physician.
In both cases, experimental interventions need to be carried
out before it is possible to offer providers specific techniques for
achieving patient education through argumentation.
In general, the role of information within a process of
education is different from its role within a deliberative process.
As discussed previously, in the latter situation information is
relevant only if it informs the argumentative component of
deliberation. This means that, if during the opening stage of
deliberation, the provider realizes the patient has wrong beliefs
or information about the disease, the dialogue may shift to
an education dialogue and then shift back to the deliberation.
However, the potential for threat to freedom seems different in
the two cases: it may be higher during an education dialogue,
because the provision of information entails expectations for
further limitations to freedom; it should be lower during a
deliberation dialogue, where patients should be fully involved
in the decision, thus maintaining a fair degree of control over
what is being decided and what they will have to commit to. An
example of the first situation is provided by the following excerpt,
from a consultation in a diabetes outpatient clinic (Bigi, 2014b).
The patient (P) and the doctor (D) are discussing the patient’s
health situation and the patient starts asking questions about the
correct choice of food:
P: what about beans, peas, can I eat those?
D: of course
P: but I noticed that they raise my glucose values
D: well, yes, you can eat them but appropriate quantities. So,
for example, if you want to have pasta with beans you will add
less pasta than when you have pasta with butter
P: also vegetable soup?
D: eh, of course because
P: if I make vegetable soup I noticed it [the glycemia] increases
D: vegetable soup, excellent question, it contains potatoes or
carrots. Potatoes for example have a higher glycemic index
so...
P: also carrots?
D: also carrots, but less than potatoes
P: I see...
This can be described as an education dialogue, because
it has been triggered by a question from the patient,
aimed at integrating a knowledge gap. The doctor replies
by making examples of correct behaviors and by explaining
the characteristics of different kinds of food. The doctor’s
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explanations carry implications for the patient’s behavior: if
the patient is informed that potatoes contain more sugar than
carrots, from now on he cannot just go on eating as many
potatoes as he wants, because he can be held accountable for such
behavior. In this sense, an education dialogue can contain a threat
to freedom.
A different case is the one of the deliberation dialogue, like
the following, also an excerpt from a consultation in a diabetes
outpatient clinic (Bigi, 2014b). The doctor (D) has explained to
the patient (P) that she really needs to be careful about her weight,
because it could impact negatively on her diabetes. She starts a
deliberation dialogue in which she invites the patient to decide
how she wants to cope with the situation:
D: ok, so from my point of view I can’t suggest much. You
are already taking strong medications for your diabetes, which
means that if the three branches of a therapy are physical
activity, medications and eating habits, I am already pretty
high on medications. It would be better to act on the other
two levels. Only one, both, a bit of both, you have to tell me.
What do you think you can do?
P: I would like to...
D: not I would like
P: no, I would like to, really...
D: ok, what we would like is the ideal situation, it’s perfection,
but what is it that you can actually do at this point of your life?
P: I don’t know what I will be able to do...
P’s daughter: why don’t you come to the gym with me, Mom?
Three months?
P: ok, let’s go, let’s try...
D: three months at the gym, ok then, 3 months at the gym,
and we could add to that no restrictions on eating, but a very
careful management of sweets
P: no..., look, I don’t mind giving up sweets, but don’t make
me give up fruit
D: that’s ok, I’m telling you, let’s negotiate. Let’s choose two
things, 3 months at the gym, no sweets and you can have fruit.
Let’s try and see how it works, ok?
Also in this case, the doctor’s opening turn contains an
explanation that implies restrictions on the patient’s freedom, but
the deliberation dialogue that follows actively involves the patient
in the process of decision making regarding which freedoms to
give up and which to retain. In this particular case, the doctor is
very good at allowing the patient to express her preferences, at
the same time putting forward proposals for action that she can
agree to or refuse. In this way, the patient retains control over the
actions that are decided upon and she can freely decide what she
wants to commit to.
So, while in the case of education, special attention should
be paid to the way information is presented, in the case
of deliberation it is the “procedure” that should be followed
carefully in order to ensure patients’ full participation, thereby
limiting reactance. By “procedure” is meant the structure of the
deliberation dialogue as described in Figure 2.
In both cases, the adoption of new strategies in the clinical
practice entails a challenge at the institutional level of context,
which is what we turn to in the following section.
INTRODUCING PRO-ENGAGEMENT
STRATEGIES IN THE CLINICAL PRACTICE:
A CHALLENGE FOR HEALTHCARE
SYSTEMS
As mentioned in the introductory section of the paper, the
definition itself of patient engagement entails an opening to the
wider context of the healthcare system within which providers
and patients interact. The focus on very specific dialogical
processes proposed in this paper does not imply a different
perspective, quite the contrary.
The description of the model of the deliberation dialogue (see
Figure 2) allows to visualize the components of this complex
dialogical process, and to ponder their roles in relation to the
achievement of the final goal of a participatory and collaborative
decision (itself a pre-requisite for behavior change). In particular,
the role of information has been discussed in relation to the
aims of patient education and deliberation. The crucial role of
argumentative strategies has been pointed out in relation to the
prevention or softening of reactance, and the support to processes
that may lead to full patient engagement.
The previous discussion has been conducted at a theoretical
level and has proceeded from a top-down approach. The
conclusions that can be drawn at this level are still in the
form of hypotheses and will have to be confirmed through
experiments and interventions. However, even at this theoretical
level, the awareness of the optimal realization of crucial dialogical
processes within the medical encounter allows some reflections
regarding the setting in which such processes take place. In order
to make the discussion more concrete, the Italian healthcare
system will be used as an example, given the familiarity of the
author with its structure (Bigi, 2012).
The Italian Healthcare System
Italy’s health care system as we know it today was officially
born in 1978 (Centro di ricerca sulle amministrazioni pubbliche
“V. Bachelet”, 2008, pp. 4–12). The system is founded on a
principle of “universality,” which means that minimal levels
of healthcare should be guaranteed to everyone. In coherence
with this principle, medications and exams are mostly paid
for by the healthcare system with resources collected through
taxation. Citizens may be required to contribute for a smaller
part to the expenses. As a consequence, the system is quite
easily accessible, at least at the level of general practice,
which is free and managed by single practitioners through
appointments. Disadvantages of the system are that not all
the 20 regions in which Italy is divided are able to manage
resources optimally, which leads to bad imbalances in the
provision of healthcare. Moreover, in case of economic crises,
the central government may decide to cut the healthcare
budget, which of course has an impact on the quality of care
provided.
One important implication of healthcare being managed
centrally is that all providers working for the public healthcare
system are employees of the public administration and, as
such, have the juridical status of “public officials.” This means
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that in their capacities as healthcare professionals they are
the representatives of the central government, which delegates
to them the safeguard of health intended as a public good
(Costituzione della Repubblica italiana [Constitution of the
Italian Republic], 2009, art.32). In this context, prescriptions and
certificates signed by providers are public instruments, which, if
improperly written or signed, can cause providers to undergo a
penal trial.
In case of malpractice, the criteria that the judge uses
to evaluate a healthcare professional’s conduct are the ones
of diligence and information. In the case of diligence,
providers have to do everything and the best that is in their
possibilities, having considered the situation of the patient
(Bianca, 1965). In the case of information, professionals must
provide all the relevant information to patients regarding the
procedures they will undergo, along with potential risks and
advantages. The Constitution (art. 32) states that nobody can
be made to undergo a treatment unless they freely accept to.
This leads to the obligation to provide and require explicit
Informed Consent from patients, in all of the cases that
entail procedures in which the patient is a passive subject
(e.g., surgical operations). In the case of drug prescriptions,
e.g., in outpatient clinics or in general practice, formal
Informed Consent is not required because patients can always
refuse treatment, but the obligation to provide thorough
information remains. In any case, the only criterion that
must guide providers’ decisions is patients’ quality of life and
wellbeing.
A Challenge for the Healthcare System
The description of the structure of the Italian healthcare system
and of providers’ juridical obligations reveals the degree of
complexity of providers’ task. As public officials, providers
have an obligation to exercise their profession with diligence,
which entails the obligation to information giving. On the
other hand, in any circumstance patients are free (by law)
to refuse or interrupt therapeutic regimens. The reasons for
not wanting to take care of one’s own health are not as
improbable as they may seem. Incorrect information collected
on the Internet, through acquaintances, via the mass media,
may lead patients to become suspicious of certain treatments
or to decide not to take any “chemical drugs.” Wrong beliefs
regarding the definition of healthy food or healthy nutrition may
lead patients to opt for unhealthy eating habits, thus damaging
their health (see, Bigi and Pollaroli, 2016 for a discussion on
this topic). The asymmetrical social roles predefined by the
context of interaction may also play against the construction of
trust between patients and providers, thus complicating even
more the achievement of the institutional goals of patients’
wellbeing.
Wrong information, badly informed beliefs, the tension
created by misaligned expectancies related to each other’s roles
within the encounter may concur to create more opportunities
for the arousal of reactance rather than patient engagement. Very
recent data regarding patient non-adherence to treatments in
Italy (ItalianMedicines Agency, 2015) cannot be ascribed entirely
to these causes, but certainly indicate that the problem exists and
needs attention.
The discussion conducted in the preceding sections has
pointed out the crucial role played by argumentation in both
the process of patient education and of shared deliberation.
In both cases, the potential for the reduction of reactance is
very high and should be tested experimentally. However, in
consideration of the institutional constraints presented in the
previous section, there is one more reason to urge the system
to innovate. Indeed, the obligation for providers to provide
information to patients combined with findings on the high
potential for a boomerang effect of information would suggest
that providers be not only trained to provide information
appropriately, but also be put in the conditions to do so. The
suggestion of allowing more time and resources for trying out
argumentative strategies in the context of patient education goes
in this direction. Moreover, if patients are free to interrupt
treatment at any time and providers cannot force them, it is
also true that they can try to persuade them, if continuing
treatment is good for patients’ health. In this case too it is an
issue of appropriate training in argumentation (Bigi, 2015 for
a discussion on this point), but also of having the opportunity
of spending time with patients, either personally or as a
team.
As the issue of time is very common and cuts across national
boundaries, a consideration regarding chronic conditions can be
made. Indeed, the time for individual encounters is not very long
and it is not possible to educate, motivate, and train patients
to the use of devices, while listening to them and doing the
paperwork required in the space of 15–18 min. However, chronic
conditions have an “advantage,” which is that they last in time.
The opportunity of meeting with patients on a regular basis for
years, offers the possibility to distribute the various tasks over
different encounters. One time it might be a priority to conduct
a session of education on a certain topic, and the following
time it might be more important to focus on motivating the
patient.
Finally, as already argued by other scholars (Wagenaar,
2006), sometimes healthcare facilities should be designed more
appropriately, in order to limit the perception of alienation
(and thus, loss of freedom) in patients. Entering very complex
buildings, with no clear signs and getting lost; interacting with
dismissive or non-professional personnel; waiting for a long
time in a stuffy corridor, with lots of people, while sitting
on an uncomfortable chair: all this may not be conducive to
collaborative and trusting relationships during the encounter.
Therefore, the challenge for any healthcare system, also in
times of fewer resources and sustainability emergency, is not
only to reduce budgets and cut on expenses, but also to rethink
or restructure some crucial points in the system that hinder
engagement and collaboration among all the actors in the
system.
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